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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine Japanese Official
Development Assistance (ODA) in the period since World War II
and the way in which the Japanese have used ODA to further
Japan's national security interests.
Japanese ODA began as war reparations to Southeast Asia
in the 1950's.
Since then, Japanese aid policy has shifted
focus three times.
These three shifts reflect important
changes in Japanese aid policy and provide a useful
perspective for understanding the way the Japanese have shaped
their aid policy to further their national interests in a
changing international environment.
First, early Japanese experience with ODA gave them a
clear understanding of the utility of ODA for Japanese
economic development, that is, to secure raw materials for its
industries and to maintain and develop markets for its
exports. Second, as war reparations declined in importance as
a rationale for ODA, the Japanese came to see their national
security interests in economic terms and to see ODA as an
instrument of national security policy. Third, Japan's
maturing perception of ODA as an instrument of security policy
led the Japanese to see ODA as an appropriate response to the
demands of Western allies (particularly the United States) for
increased
Japanese
"burden
sharing"
with
respect
to
international security crises such as the 1991 war in the
Persian Gulf.
Thus the Japanese have employed ODA as an effective
diplomatic tool not only with developing countries but also
with Japan's Western allies, first as war reparations, then in
conjunction with its neomercantilist economic policy and
finally as an element of its national security policy.

vii

JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY:
ESTABLISHING "GREATER EAST ASIAN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE"
THROUGH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

INTRODUCTION
Japan is an emerging great power, yet little is known
about- the country.

The power acquired and supported by its

economic prosperity seems to confuse people, especially
those who measure a country's power by military strength.
Japan has used economic power primarily to protect its
national interests since the end of World War II.
The national security of a nation requires that it
assure its survival from one generation to the next.

Each

nation decides its own national interests, considering their
strength, weakness, obstacles, and availability of means to
pursue them.

In Japan's case, one means to protect national

security has been economic, because of Japan's poor resource
self-sufficiency.

The nation's economic survival has been

considered the top priority.

The national interest was

shaped to maintain a steady flow of food and natural
resources.
Pre-war Japan also considered the military as one of
the means to attain its national security.

Traditionally,

strength proven by military victories over political and
commercial rivals has been a means to attain national
interests.

States fought wars to expand territories through

which they became richer, stronger, and as a result, more
2

3
secure.

Japan expanded its territories in China and

Southeast Asia using military force.

What confuses people

today is that post-war Japan uses a different combination of
means to carve out and protect a viable "living space" in the
contemporary world.

Japan has learned to employ economic

power primarily to protect and advance its broad security
interest.
One explanation for the change is the new constitution of
1946.

Japan renounced wars and abandoned possession of any

military

devices

provided

the

other

guideline

than

for

for Japan

defense
to

purposes.

pursue

its

This

national

interests— securing food and raw materials— by economic means
alone.

However, Japan's geographical and political isolation

imposed

important

economic

means

restrictions

of

recovery.

by

limiting

Germany

the

could

be

range
and

of
was

integrated into the economic bloc of Western Europe; but no
similar cultural and economic block was available to absorb
and constrain Japan.
Japan to join,

Since there was no economic bloc for

Japan developed its economy independently,

through trade, and came to see the importance of trade to its
survival.
It was the pursuit of its national economic interest
that enabled Japan to survive as a state, to succeed this far
among the Western democratic nations,

and to achieve great

power status in the post-war world which is now emerging.
Japan did so with a clear strategy in mind.

Without such a

4
strategy, its dramatic postwar economic recovery and
prosperity might not have been possible.

What is the

strategy which made Japan an emerging great power, even a
threat to others?

It was driven by national security—

economic survival of the nation— which reflected national
interests.1
In essence Japan's strategy was neomercantilist.

It

regarded foreign trade as the nation-state's most important
strategic variable for prosperity and power.2 The policy
applied by Japan was to emphasize export promotion in order
to acquire necessary resources and meet higher standards of
international competition to survive in the competitive
world.

In order to support the neomercantilist strategy,

Japan used its official foreign aid successfully to
cultivate new markets and maintain them for its exports, and
to obtain necessary natural resources and food.
Japan began providing foreign aid as war reparation
payments to Southeast Asian countries in the 1950s.

It took

the form of procurement of Japanese goods, which later
benefitted Japan by developing markets for Japanese heavy
industrial products during its miraculous economic
growth.

Williams S. Dietrich, In The Shadow of The Rising Sun; The
Political Roots of American Economic Decline. (University Park,
Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 62.
2A Dictionary of Economics
445.

(London: Macmillan Press,

1987),

5
To illustrate Japanese national interests, Karel van
Wolferen compares Japan's post-war economic resurgence to an
earlier campaign to "catch up with the West" in the Meiji
period (1869-1914).

The ultimate goal of both campaigns was

not directly associated with the welfare of the people, but
rather with preserving Japan's long-term ability to remain
an independent power.

In the earlier period, Japan's aims

were defensive: economic growth was considered vital to
protect Japan from foreign powers.

Industrialization and

militarization went hand in hand as Japan adopted a slogan
of "rich country, strong military" to promote the campaign
among public.3

This campaign was necessary in order to

gather the Japanese people as one and guide the country to a
common national goal, because the whole country was
experiencing a very high degree of social change after 250
years of self-imposed isolation from outside world.
The second catching-up campaign began in the 1950s
after completion of post-war reconstruction.

As opposed to

the rapid industrial development in the Meiji period,
industrial dominance by acquiring a large share in the
international market was considered the key. to the national
security in post-war era.

Since the use of military force

to shape Japan's external environment was proscribed,
Japan's strategy relied almost exclusively on economic
3Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and
Politics of a Stateless Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989),
375-376.

6
means.4

Vogel writes,

In the early decades after World War II, Japan became,
accustomed to protecting infant industries and nursing
them to international competitive standards. Only when
there was virtually no danger of foreign products
competing successfully in their home markets would they
slowly and reluctantly reduce formal tariff barriers.
They made it virtually impossible until the 1970s for
foreigners to own their own subsidiaries in Japan or to
have even indirect economic control over firms in
Japan.5
Japan did not coin a strategic slogan in the post-war
era as it did in Meiji period.

There was no need for one

because the campaign— "catching up with the West"— had
become almost an obsession to the Japanese people in order
to protect themselves from foreign powers.

Once a strategy

is understood by all the players, a constant reminder of it
is not necessary.

In such an environment, even a

subconscious strategy can guide the players toward the
common objective just as a consciously acknowledged
strategy.

So the neomercantilist strategy to pursue Japan's

national security did not have to be explicitly articulated
in order to be executed.

In post-war Japan, the campaign of

"catching up with the West" through economic development was
engraved deeply in the society as a whole; subconsciously
shared among the people; and vigorously pursued by all.6
4Ibid., 377-378.
5Ezra F. Vogel,
(Spring 1986), 760.

"Pax Nipponica?"

Foreign Affairs

vol.

64

V a n Wolferen writes that although economic growth has
achieved at their expense, the Japanese have had a single-minded
dedication to the nation's economic development and prosperity

7
Kent Calder argues however, that Japan is a "reactive
state" by which he means that Japan possesses little
strategic intent and successful implementation.

He lists

two distinguishing characteristics of the "reactive state":
(1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign
economic policy initiatives when it has the power and
national incentives to do so? and (2) it responds to outside
pressures for change, erratically, unsystematically, and
often incompletely.7

Both conclusions can be challenged by

reference to Japanese aid programs.
Calder does not deny that Japan has strategic
objectives which reflect its national interests.

However,

he argues that they are not coherent and actively pursued
because Japan lacks a strong institutional authority, which
he believes is an indispensable factor for an active state.
However, strategy does not necessarily require aggressive
action or decisive policy style, especially when it is aimed
at long-run as the cases examined in this study.

Postwar

Japan had a clear strategy to pursue its national economic
interests and attain national security.

The neomercantilist

policy described below was a means of executing the
strategy.

Furthermore, in the case of Japanese foreign aid

since the Meiji era. Catching up with the strongest in the world
was the highest goal of every Japanese.
Van Wolferen, op. cit.,
376-378.
7Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation:
Explaining the Reactive State," World Politics vol. XL, no. 4 (July
1988), 519.

8

examined in this thesis, the incoherence is not in evidence,
as Calder argues.

Rather, we see a consistent pursuit of

national interests through the use of official aid.
A single leading agency with a clear and conscious
strategy is not a necessary requirement for coherent
strategy conduct.

As I will show, cooperation among

official agencies that share unstated assumptions, norms,
values, and aims can play the role of a strategy-creating
institution even in the absence of an explicit Grand Design.
This is exactly how the pursuit of Japanese national
security through trade with a use of foreign aid has worked
since the 1950s.
With an understanding of the characteristics of Japan's
economic national security, this thesis examines Japan's
pursuit of its national interests through the use of foreign
aid.

It will pay particularly close attention to three

Southeast Asian countries as targets of Japanese national
interests.

The thesis will show that Japan, without a

single strategist, consistently pursued clearly understood
national interests to satisfy its economic security concerns
by using foreign aid.

CHAPTER I
JAPANESE ROLE IN "BURDEN SHARING"

In recent years, Japanese foreign aid policies have
come under increasing scrutiny and criticism as demands have
mounted for Japan to increase its contribution to
international security.

As a response to the demand, Japan

pledged to increase its allocation of Official Development
Assistance (ODA).

However, official foreign aid does not

fully satisfy international, especially U.S., security
interests.

Rather, it serves as a means of protecting

Japan's economic security and pursuing its own national
interests.
Pressure for Burden-Sharing
The paths Japan took to achieve its national security
objective have brought criticism of Japan for being a free
rider.

Japanese trade policies brought a prosperous economy

at the price of severe trade frictions with Western allies,
especially with the United States.

As a result, Japan has

been pressured for so-called "burden sharing" and to
contribute adequately to the maintenance of a stable
international system.

The term "burden-sharing" was

introduced by the United States.
9

Shafiqul Islam describes

10

it as follows:
It [the U.S.] contributes a disproportionate share
of the burden of the common defense of its European
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.
Burden-sharing, the United States demanded, should be
more equitable, with Europe shouldering a greater share
of the cost of its own defense.8
According to Islam, Japan was already on America's list of
"unfair share of burden practitioners" by the late 1960s and
became the top "unfair burden-sharer" in the 1980s.

As

Japan gained strength in economies, finance, and technology,
the label of "unfair burden-sharer" accelerated the view of
"Japan as a free rider" at the expense of American share.9

The Use of ODA in Burden-Sharing
To measure the burden of defense, the share of military
spending in a nation's GNP is usually used.
to combine military and aid spending.

Japan prefers

In 1989, it allocated

1.3% of GNP— 1% on defense and 0.3% on aid— for its share of
burden.

In spite of the pressure for "burden sharing,"

there are two obstacles to Japan increasing its share
militarily.

First, the Japanese Constitution which

renounces wars makes it difficult for the Japanese to
allocate large military budget.

The 1% of GNP defense

budget policy, declared by Prime Minister Miki in 1976, is
8Shafiqul
Islam,
"Beyond
Burden-Sharing:
Economics And
Politics of Japanese Foreign Aid," in Yen For Development: Japanese
Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-sharing ed. Shafiqul Islam
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 192.
9Ibid., 192-193.
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also a constraint to a large military.

Second, because 1%

of a very large GNP is a large sum, Japan is already the
third largest military spender.

To further increase in its

defence budget will upset the former Soviet Union, China,
Korea, and the ASEAN countries which had brutal experience
of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War.10
Considering these factors, the Japanese government
pledged to increase spending on ODA to meet its share of the
burden as a member of the world community.

The increase was

first publicly stated in the mid-1970s by then Foreign
Minister Takeo Fukuda.

He argued that Japan should fill the

role of the United States in Asia through economic
assistance as American power declined in the region.11
This argument was put into practice when he became the Prime
Minister.

Fukuda ensured the Japanese commitment by

announcing the first of a series of medium-term targets at
the Bonn Summit in 1978.

His intention was also to reduce

the trade surplus with Western nations so that Japanese
economic

security— maintaining markets for Japan's exports-

-would be protected.12

10Susan J. Pharr, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, September 28, 1988.
1lRobert M. Orr, Jr., "The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations,"
Asian Survey vol. XXVIII, no. 7 (July 1988), 745.
12Ibid. , 745-746.
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Doubling Plans and Other Initiatives
The First Medium-Term Target was to double the annual
value of aid to $2.8 billion in five years.

By early 1978,

Japan's foreign exchange reserves had reached the highest
point ever and it became apparent that Japan would fulfill
the pledge.

As a result, the original five-year time period

was shortened to three years and Japan kept its pledge with
ODA that totaled $3.3 billion in the third year.

The second

plan adopted by the Suzuki Administration in 1981 promised
again to double the amount of ODA in the 197 6-1980 period to
$24 billion between 1981 and 1985.

Japan failed to keep

this pledge due to a rapid rise in the value of the U.S.
dollar against the yen during this period, though it was
achieved in yen terms.13
The third plan, announced in 1985, set a goal to double
the 1985 net ODA disbursement level to $7.6 billion per
annum, and thereafter to extend the total to $40 billion
during a seven-year period 1985-1992.

The sudden jump in

yen value began in the mid 1980s pushed up the dollar value
of Japanese ODA.

At the 1987 Venice Summit, Japan announced

that it was going to shorten the target period by two years,
to 1990.

However, this $40 billion target was already met

by 1988 and Japan had to establish a new target.

At the

Toronto Summit in 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita announced

13Toru Yanagihara and Anne Emig, "An Overview
Foreign Aid," in Yen For Development. 41-42.

Of

Japan's
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the fourth medium-term plan which consisted of doubling the
volume of 1983-87 period to $50 billion from 1988 through
1992.14
Besides these doubling plans, Japan also announced
"capital recycling measures."

The first of these appeared

in 1986 as a $10 billion package of government and private
funds to international financial institutions.

The next

package of $20 billion was announced in' May 1987.15
Japan's initiative was further reinforced in a new
cooperation scheme in which the expansion of ODA was
regarded as one of the three main pillars.
In May 1988 the government of then Prime Minister Noboru
Takeshita announced its "International Cooperation
Initiative." This initiative reflects Japan's
acceptance of its natural responsibility as an advanced
democracy to contribute actively to the protection of
world peace and the achievement of international
prosperity by playing a role commensurate with its
increased international status.16
Japan is fully aware of the importance of open markets
for its economic security and it would share the burden of
Europe and the United States for that purpose.

Especially

since the value of the yen skyrocketed in the mid-1980s, the
urgency felt by the Japanese government can be seen by the
repeated announcements of doubling plans and other measures
for helping developing countries.
14Ibid.
15Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity
Leadership?" Pacific Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 472.
16Japan, MFA Japan's ODA Annual Report 1990. 6.

For

After being criticized for the quality of its foreign
aid, Japan

began to reform its aid programs to satisfy other

donors and

recipients.

At the Paris Summit in 1989, Japan

announced allocations of aid in specific areas.

It pledged

$600 million in grant aid to the Least Developed Countries
(LLDCs) in

a three year period beginning in 1990; pledged $2

billion in

environmental aid? and presented an initiative in

third world debt relief.

For example, the financial

recycling plan17 was expanded from three to five years and
taxation measures for Japanese commercial banks were to be
taken to respond to the new Debt Strategy initiated by the
U.S. government.18 The Export-Import Bank of Japan and
Official Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) have also been
helping indebted countries with new loans and rescheduling
of payments.

Strong Public Support for ODA
Today foreign economic assistance is widely regarded as
the alternative form of burden sharing to military spending
in Japan.

Not only the government but also the public

acknowledge the importance of ODA.
Poor in energy and mineral resources, Japan cannot feed
itself. To pay for imports of much-needed raw materials
17In order to help heavily indebted countries, Japan provided
extra assistance measures from its financial surplus as a result of
highly valued yen.
18Japan,
MFA, . Diplomatic
Activities 1989. 67-69.

Bluebook:

Japan's

Diplomatic
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and food, Japan feels compelled to export industrial
goods. Thus, a peaceful world conducive to free trade
is a requisite for Japan's security. It is to this end
that Japan chooses to fulfill its responsibilities as a
major economic power by offering economic assistance to
the developing countries.19
This acknowledgement is shown by wide public support.
According to a foreign policy survey conducted by the Prime
Minister's office in October 1988, 39.5% of the public felt
that Japan should expand aid and 44.2% felt Japan should
maintain the present level of aid.20

These figures show

strong cognition of the Japanese of foreign aid.21
Although Japanese security interest behind the foreign aid
is not mentioned repeatedly by the government, the strong
support for aid suggests that the Japanese people understand
the importance of aid to Japan's survival.
Reflecting the public support, Japan's ODA budget
increases every year at a high rate compared with other
budget categories which tells how important ODA has become
for Japanese economic survival.

The Japanese government

announced its decision to allocate 952.2 billion yen ($7.38
billion)22 for 1992 ODA budget, a 7.8% increase from the

19Akira Kubota, "Foreign Aid: Giving With One Hand?" Japan
Quarterly (April/June 1985), 140-141.
20Japan, MFA Japan's ODA Annual Report 1989. 19.
21According to a poll conducted in 1989, only 4 percent of the
American considered foreign aid as the most important problem for
the country.
George Gallup Jr. , The Gallup Poll Public Opinion
1989. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), 120.
22US$1 = 129 yen is used as the exchange rate for 1992.
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1991 budget, to attain the pledge of Fourth Medium-Term
Target set in 1988.23

As for the total operational

account, the proposed figure is 1,699 billion yen ($13.2
billion) which is a 11.1% increase from the previous year
and first double digit growth since 1984 .24

This increase

is highly significant when the following two facts are
considered: 1) the increase in the defense budget is less
than half of ODA's; 2) a decrease in tax revenues imposes
limits on the 1992 budget as a whole.
The boost in foreign aid spending at a time of limited
increases in other types of expenditures reflects the
growing recognition in recent years of Japan's
international responsibilities, an issue that came to
the forefront of the political agenda in 1991.25
The recognition of Japan's responsibility can be translated
as Japan's realization that it cannot rely on others to
maintain a favorable world environment for Japan's security.
This is especially so when Europe and the United States
carry economic burdens in Eastern Europe and Latin America
in the time of world wide economic recession.
Thus it can be seen that Japan has responded to the
demands that it carry an adequate share of the security
burden by increasing allocations of ODA to developing
23"ODA Ohaba 7.8% Zou (ODA
Shinbun. 28 December, 1991, p. 1.

Large

7.8%

Increase),"

Asahi

24Total operational account includes general account, the
borrowing from the Fiscal Financing Fund, equity bonds for various
international development banks and some other special accounts.
25Margo Grimm, "Foreign Aid Boosted in Japan's FY 1992 Budget,"
JEI Report no. IB (January 10, 1992), 10.
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countries.

The pace of the increase in the amount is

impressive.

However, the objective of the increase,

initiated by doubling plans and other development assures,
did not originally derive from Japan's concerns for
developing countries.

Rather, it was specifically aimed at

easing Western democratic nations' dissatisfactions with
Japan over persistent trade imbalances; and, more
importantly, to prevent the markets from closing for Japan's
exports.

The fact that Japan's doubling plans have always

been announced at G-7 summits implies who the real audience
is.

Japanese ODA in the scheme of burden-sharing has become

a very strong reason for its pursuit of a neomercantilist
strategy to attain its national interests.

CHAPTER II
JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: AN OVERVIEW

Japanese ODA has four types of assistance: 1) Capital
grants; 2) Technical assistance; 3) Bilateral loans; 4) Aid
through multilateral agencies.

Among the four types, loans

have always accounted for the majority of the total.

Loans

attract Japanese commercial interests because of the large
amount of money involved.

Also loans are usually spent on

capital intensive infrastructure projects, which pave the
way for Japanese direct foreign investments.

It can be said

that through loans, the Japanese have pursued their national
interests to attain national security.

However, the other

three types of assistance have received greater emphasis
recently.

This is largely due to the mounting criticism and

pressure for Japan to separate aid from the narrow pursuit
of national interests.

Even as it adapts its aid practices

to meet others' demands, however, Japan satisfies its
national interest through the burden-sharing scheme
discussed in the previous chapter.

The emphasis on Asia

shows Japanese priorities and concentration of interests in
the region.

18
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Grant Aid
Grant aid provides funds without imposing repayment
obligations on recipient countries.

Japanese grant aid is

targeted to social infrastructure investments which are not
allowable under the financing regulations of the OECF, the
Export-Import Bank of Japan, and Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA).

Grant aid provides financial

resources for the procurement of equipment, facilities,
materials, and services necessary for economic and social
development programs, such as housing, education, medical
care, research, food and food production.26

Recently,

environment was added as a new agenda for grants and has
been paid particular attention in Japanese aid policy.27
Traditionally, the proportion of grant aid in Japan’s
ODA portfolio has been low.

However, the relative share of

grants has been expanded in recent years in accordance with
the government1s changing emphasis, due to pressure from
other donors to improve aid quality.

Table 1 shows an

increasing trend of grant aid not only in amount but also in
share of total ODA.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) takes a position
that grant aid should be given to the poorest countries, but
this does not coincide with actual practice.

By 1977, LLDCs

26Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid: Policy-Making And Politics
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 119.
27Japan, MFA Japan's ODA Annual Report 1988. 65.
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received only 23% of grant aid.
even today.

This trend seems to continue

Table 2 shows the continuous trend of allocation

of grants to non-LLDCs.
Although Asia received more than half of Japanese grant
aid in the past and the amount continues to increase,

the

Asian share in recent years has been declining, to 4 6.5% in
1990.

The traditionally large share of the Asian allocation

reveals JapanVs strong security interests in Asia, but the
share for Africa (sub-Saharan African countries) has increased
because of the government's new emphasis on aid to the region.
This

is a result of the urgent humanitarian needs in the

region.

The Fourth Medium-Term Target stated an emphasis on

LLDCs as one of the pillars, and the emphasis on grants to
LLDCs, especially to Africa, which has an historically strong
linkage to Europe, can be seen as a sign of "burden sharing."
Japanese security interests do not relate directly to the
African LLDCs, so the implication is that Japan is easing the
Western nations' share of the African burden.
Technical Assistance
"Technical cooperation is an activity which teaches and
transfers

technologies,

skills,

and

knowledge

important for the development of human resources,

which

and thus

contribute to the development of developing countries."28

28Japan's ODA 1988, op. cit. , 75.
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The aim of Japanese technical assistance is to teach
Japanese technology and know-how to people in recipient
countries so that they will be able to play a central role .
in their own development.

The Japanese also believe that

the personal level of interchange will benefit relations
between Japan and the recipients.
As with the case of grants, technical assistance has
been emphasized in Japanese ODA lately for the same reason—
pressure from other donors.

The Fourth Medium-Term Target

states:
Technical Assistance will be positively expanded in the
area of human resource development including various
measures for overseas students, for receiving trainees
in Japan, and for the dispatch of experts, as well as in
non-material cooperation including measures for the
upgrading of the technical level of developing
countries.29
Although, historically, Japan did not pour funds into
technical assistance, the trend is changing.

The share of

technical assistance in total ODA is still comparatively
small, but the actual allocation is surely on the rise.

The

strategy for allocation of grants also applies to technical
assistance.

Its geographical concentration in Asia suggests

the importance of the region to Japanese economic survival.
The recipients of technical assistance are those
countries which do not qualify for financial assistance30

29Japanfs ODA 1988, op. cit., 76.
30They are the developing countries with fairly high income,
accumulated debt, and oil producing countries.
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as well as LLDCs, such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Tanzania,
which cannot be given a large scale of financial aid because
they lack human resources and technical devices to utilize
large amount of money effectively.31

This indicates that

regions such as Latin America, where heavily indebted
middle-income countries32 are common, should receive large
amounts of technical assistance for their share in total
ODA.

Latin America received 8.3% of total Japanese ODA and

17.7% of total technical assistance in 1989.

Table 5 shows

that a relatively high amount of technical assistance flows
to Latin America every year.

However, since the share of

technical assistance

in total ODA is smaller than loans (20%

in 1989), the amount

is very small.

assistance recipient

is no match for the top loan recipient.

The top technical

Bilateral ODA Loans
In 1990, 42.5% of total Japanese ODA was in the form of
loans.

Historically, the share of loans in Japanese foreign

aid has been high.33

Bilateral loans, because of the large

amount of funds exchanged, have a strong influence in
Japan*s overall bilateral relations with recipients.

Alan

^ Japan's ODA Annual Report 1988. 75.
32Middle-income countries in 1987 were countries with GNP per
capita more than $700.
33In 1985 and 1986, more than half of total Japanese bilateral
ODA was in the form of loans while the United States and Canada
allocated about 10%, France and Italy about 20%, and Germany about
30% of total ODA for loans.
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Rix argues:
Yen loans were the core of Japanese foreign aid policy
and dominated official thinking about aid since Japan
first became a donor. Loans gave the most pressing,
impetus to official aid, for through them Japan was tied
politically and commercially to the world's developing
nations - as, in debt, were they to Japan.34
The bilateral government loans are given to recipient
countries through OECF to provide large amounts of funds at
low interest rates and over long repayment periods.

Loans

stimulate capital intensive projects because they enable
developing countries to undertake large projects, like
construction of infrastructure and production facilities,
which otherwise they cannot afford.

In order to repay loans

with interest, the project must generate high return.

This

is another reason why large capital projects are favored.
The amount of loans through OECF is increasing every
year.

It increased from 1,903 billion yen ($8.6 billion) in

1981 to 5,950 billion yen ($41 billion) in 1990.35

The

increase in loans not only attracts Japanese commercial
interests and enables Japanese business to participate in
projects but also serves Japanese security interests.
Improvement of infrastructure is a prerequisite for Japanese
direct investment and more investment creates stronger

34Rix, Japan's Economic Aid. 38.
35DAC's exchange rates are used for both years.
applied rest of the paper.

They will be

linkages with developing countries.36
As Table 6 illustrates, the share of loans to Asia is
very high.

This is much higher than the share of grants and

technical assistance.

One reason is that many Asian

countries, especially those which belong to the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have been more
successful in economic development than other developing
countries.

The requests for ODA loans from these countries

for large-scale projects are well suited to the
characteristics and purposes of loans.37

A second reason

is that the Japanese want to take advantage of the long-term
aid relationship in the region, begun with reparation
payments.

However, the most important reason is that Japan

has national interest priorities in ASEAN.38
Multilateral ODA
The Japanese contributed multilateral ODA funds to
international organizations for the purpose of economic
development in developing countries.

Multilateral

organizations can be divided into two groups: international
financial institutions, which lend funds for development
purposes, and United Nations agencies, which are engaged
36|,Yuchishogaiyoin wa Yahari Infra Seibi (Investment Obstacle
is Infrastructure Improvement),11 Kokusai Kaihatsu Journal, no. 418
(December 1991), 28-31.
37Japan's ODA 1990, op. cit., 81.
38A s illustrated later in this thesis, Japan has
security interests for its economic survival in ASEAN.

strong
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mainly in activities relating to technical cooperation.39
Japan has allocated funds to both types of organization
since the first international development contribution of
$80,000 to the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance in 19 52 .40

The share of multilateral

assistance in total ODA has varied from one year to the next
in the 1980s, but it has still increased compared with the
previous decade.

The increase is influenced by criticisms

of Japan's aid practices.

These criticisms are best muted

by channelling aid through multilateral agencies.
There are some advantages to channelling aid to
developing countries through multilateral organizations.
First, Japan can obtain important access to the specialized
knowledge and experience of various organizations.

Second,

multilateral aid can protect Japan's political neutrality.
Third, Japan can gain precious access to global aid
networks.41

Since Japan has concentrated its aid in Asia

in the past and is not familiar with other regions, the
multilateral aid is a very useful way to distribute Japanese
funds to less familiar regions effectively.

The increasing

share of multilateral assistance in total ODA explains the

39Ibid. , 88.
40J. Alexander Caldwell, "The Evolution of Japanese Economic
Cooperation, 1950-1970," in
Pacific Basin Development: The
American Interests, ed. Harald B. Malmgren (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books), 35.
41Japan's ODA 1990, op. cit. , 89.
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Japanese government's attitude toward regions outside of
Asia where "burden sharing" may be the prominent factor.
Each of the four types of Japanese foreign aid
satisfies Japan's national interests.

Loans are usually

spent for large capital intensive projects such as
infrastructure construction and many Japanese private
businesses profit through participating in such projects.
By improving infrastructure, the recipient countries attract
Japanese direct investments.

These provide Japan with some

share of the recipients' economies, and serve to secure
Japanese security interests.
The share of grants, technical assistance, and
multilateral aid in total ODA has been small compared with
loans.

However, the Japanese government seeks improvement

in these categories because of increasing criticism of
Japanese self-serving aid practices.

By responding to

criticism, Japan eases some of the pressures from other
donors, many of which are important markets for Japan's
exports.

Each of the four styles of Japanese aid helps

Japan pursue its economic interests and protect national
security.

CHAPTER III
CHARACTERISTICS OP JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

.Japanese foreign aid has four distinct features which
emphasize Japanese interests over those of the recipients.
They are: 1) Japanese aid is highly commercialized; 2) Most
of Japanese aid goes to Asia; 3) Japan provides more loans
than grants and technical assistance; 4) The quality of
Japanese aid is poor compared with aid from other donors.
These characteristics may be problems and inconveniences for
the recipients but they,support Japan's pursuit of national
security interests.

This chapter will examine each of these

characteristics in detail to clarify exactly how they work
to the Japanese advantage.
Commercialized Aid
The first characteristic, commercialized aid, is
described as "large loans and grants to poor countries with
procurement of Japanese equipment and technology, an
approach that not only enriches Japanese firms in the short
run, but also provides them with a strong marketing edge
once an aid program is finished."42

This statement brings

42Steve Coll, "Japan's Hands-On Foreign Aid: As U.S. Slashes
Assistance,
Tokyo Develops Markets for 21st Century," The
Washington Post (13, January, 1991), sec. HI.
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up Japan's "request basis" principle.

In theory, Japan

provides aid only when it receives a request from a
potential recipient country.

Project identification and

recommendation are regarded as the recipient's
responsibility.

However, the identification of projects is

carried out by Japanese nationals working for private
consulting firms, trading companies, construction companies,
and manufacturers.
Developing countries usually do not possess the
necessary means and skills to conduct the research for
project identification and to frame applications to win the
Japanese government's approval.

This inadequacy on the

recipients' part allows Japanese private companies to
identify projects, state their interests, and request
projects through official diplomatic channel.

It is up to

the companies whether or not to propose highly priced
materials which are only available in Japan.

The firms

which are involved in the initial stage of a project usually
win the contract.

Therefore, the private contractors not

only conduct the identification but are also involved in the
rest of the project— feasibility study, implementation, and
monitoring at the project field.43

As a result, the

Japanese private firms profit greatly from these official

^International Development Study Group, "Shortcomings of the
Foreign Aid Program," Economic Eve (Spring 1989), 18-19 and Bruce
Koppel and Michael Plummer, "Japan's Ascendancy as A Foreign-Aid
Power," Asian Survey vol. XXIX, no. 11, (November 1989), 1054.
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aid projects.

This practice is an example of tied aid.44

Table 11 shows the share of tied aid of Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries.

Although the figures

for Japan do not suggest that a large proportion of Japanese
aid is tied, the actual practice reveals that it is.
Companies in other countries have a hard time
participating in the business generated by Japan's
grants and loans even when aid is untied. We should not
be surprised, accordingly, that foreigners still
criticize Japan's aid as a government tool for export
promotion.45
The big private sector has always played a large role
in Japanese aid activities.

Japan stepped into the field of

economic assistance without a firmly established aid
organization to oversee aid activities.

When the reparation

agreements were reached with the recipients, a reparation
division was established in the Asian Affairs Bureau of the
MFA.

However, actual transactions regarding purchasing

goods and hiring technical services were left to each
recipient country.

It was activity between Japanese

business and the recipient governments rather than MFA's
reparation bureau and recipient governments.46

Even

without strong leadership from the MFA, Japan was successful

44Tying aid means limiting to the contributing countries and
donor countries the procurement of goods and services for bilateral
ODA and contributions to international organizations.
45Koichi Mera, "Problems in the Aid Program," Japan Echo vol.
XVI, no. 1, 1989, 14.
46Caldwell, op. cit., 33-34.
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in reflecting the national interests— establishing markets
for Japanese goods— on procurement.

Concentration of Aid in Asia
The geographical distribution of Japanese aid greatly
favors Asia.

For example in 1971, as much as 99.3% of

Japanese ODA went to Asian countries.47

There are three

reasons which explain this concentration.

The first is that

Japanese aid began as war reparations to those countries in
Asia.

Besides reparation payments, some of the recipients

were to receive additional assistance from Japan which
totaled $716 million.48

Japan also promised South Korea

$500 million for reparations and $300 million for loans in
1965 with normalization of relations.49

Even after the

payments ended, it was in Japan's security interest to
continue assisting countries where official and private ties
as well as markets for its exports had been already
established through reparations.

47Japan, MITI, Keizai Kvorvoku no Genio to Mondaiten (The
Present State and Problems of Economic Cooperation) 1972. 103.
48Myanmar (former Burma) was to receive $50 million for joint
enterprise investments over 10 years; the Philippines $250 million
commercial loans over 20 years; Indonesia $4 00 million commercial
loans and investments over 20 years; and South Vietnam $7.5 million
in government loans and $9.1 million in commercial loans. Chaiwat
Khamchoo, Japan's Southeast Asian Policy in the Post-Vietnam Era
(1975-1985^. (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington 1986), 61.
49Shigeru Oda, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan
and the Republic of Korea," American Journal of International Law
(January 1967), 155-156 quoted in Caldwell, op. cit., 32.
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The second reason for the geographical concentration of
Japanese aid is that Japan is a large importer of raw
materials and food from countries of this region.

Besides .

heavy dependence on imported oil, Japan imports 100% of its
aluminum, nickel, wool and cotton, 98% of its iron ore and
tin, 94% of its copper and 66% of its lumber.50

When Japan

lost the war in 1945, she also lost an important source of
raw materials— Northeast Asia.

During postwar period, Japan

desperately needed a replacement for Northeast Asia in order
to catch up with the West by rebuilding its economy.
found it in Southeast Asia.

Japan

Japan's share of exports from

Southeast Asia rose greatly in the 1960s and the 1970s.
During a decade from 1972 to 1982, ASEAN's exports to Japan
increased almost ten times.51

Japan imports at least 95%

of its tin, natural rubber and tropical timber from
Southeast Asia.

The region also provides more than a third

of Japanese copper ore and bauxite imports.52
The third reason is the important of geographical
location of Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.
ASEAN straddles two sea lanes that are essential to
Japan's economic survival. One is the "petroleum road,"
which originates in the Middle East and weaves its way
through the Straits of Malacca. The other is the "iron
50IMF White Paper 1980. quoted in John McDonnell, "Japan as an
importer; Its impact on Asian developing countries," in Japan's
Impact on the World eds. Alan Rix and Ross Mouer (Nathan, Q.
Australia; Japanese Studies Association of Australia, 1984), 189.
51McDonnell, op. cit. , 189.
52Ibid., 192-193.
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ore road,” which starts in western Australia and
proceeds northward to Japan.53
Besides actually exporting natural resources to Japan,
Asia's geographical location is crucial to maintain the
steady flow of raw materials to Japan from other parts of
the world, which is the lifeline of its economic survival.

Too Many Loans VS Too Few Grants and Technical Assistance
The third characteristic of Japanese aid which can be
seen to serve Japanese interests is the historical trend
that more money is spent on loans, while less is spent on
grants and technical assistance.

The Japanese government

stresses "self-help" policies to explain the trend.

It

derives from
Japan's own experience as a Third World country, in
which Japan sought to stand on its own feet economically
in a world of bigger powers. From that standpoint,
there is a decided belief in Japan that the goal of aid
is to produce economic self-reliance in developing
countries.54
It is because of this "self-help" belief that Japan
emphasizes loans and encourages the recipients to manage the
economy with fiscal constraints of obligation to repay.

The

"self-help" policy reflects on another policy, "graduation"

53Susumu Yamakage, "Japan and ASEAN: Are They Really Becoming
Closer?" in Walter Pfennig and mark M.B. Suh, eds., Aspects of
ASEAN (Munich, Cologne, London: Weltforum Verlag, 1984), 311,
quoted in Robert M. Orr, Jr., "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid
to ASEAN, the Pacific Basin and the Republic of Korea," Journal of
International Affairs vol. 41, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1987), 47.
54Pharr, op. cit.
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policy.

Japan takes the recipient's GNP per capita into

consideration before deciding what form of assistance is
appropriate and changes the mixture from grants to
concessional and non-concessional loans.55

Japan also

changes interest rates and term on loans depending on
recipient's economic situation.
Japanese national interests are not met by grants and
technical assistance as much as by loans.

Technical

assistance is not commercially attractive because it usually
costs less than one-hundredth of a capital project.
Compared with loans, grants do not provide a strong long
term economic linkage with recipients because projects
funded by grants are usually short-term and not large scale.
Grants and technical assistance do not accommodate Japanese
immediate national security interests other than in
improving the social infrastructure which keeps ordinary
people from rebelling against the regime.
Poor Aid Quality
The fourth feature of Japanese ODA is the poor aid
quality in comparison with other DAC countries.

In order to

quantify aid quality, the grant share and the grant element
are often used.56

As Tables 5, 6, and 7 indicate, Japan's

55Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Collaboration or Conflict? Foreign Aid
and U.S.-Japan Relations," Pacific Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 479.
56A grant share is the percentage of capital assistance that
do not require repayment.
A grant element indicates "degree of
concessionality of assistance" or "softness."
For example, the
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grant shares and grant elements have been very low compared
with other donors.

The Japanese government claims that the

promotion of self-help efforts and growing needs for Japan's
type of aid, situated between export credit and grant
assistance, are the reasons for Japan's poor performance in
these two categories.57

However, seen from a different

angle, these figures suggest that Japan's tendency is to
link official aid to commercial interests and national
interests.
These four characteristics of Japanese ODA are exactly
the points criticized by others.

They serve Japanese

national interests and support Japanese national security.
By tying aid, Japan cultivates markets for its exports and
provides business community with chances to benefit from
large projects.

In the long term, improvement of

infrastructure, on which loans focus, will bring in Japanese
businesses to developing countries.

Poor aid quality (small

grant share, grant element, and technical assistance and
tied aid), combined with large amount of loans, supports
pursuit commercial interests by the Japanese businesses.
The concentration of aid in Asia shows that Japan's long
term national interests lie in the region as a source of
grant element of a loan on a commercial basis (10% interest rate)
is 0%. As the terms (interest rate, repayment and grace period)
are more alleviated, the figure of the grant element is higher,
reaching 100% in the case of a grant. Japan's ODA 1990, op. cit.,
7.
57Japan's ODA 1988, op. cit., 26.
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natural resources and markets for exports.

The

characteristics of Japanese ODA clearly show that Japan has
used its ODA program for the pursuit of its national
interests and the execution of its neomercantilist strategy.

CHAPTER IV
EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE FOREIGN AID POLICY
Japan's foreign aid policy has gone through four phases
since the first war reparations were paid to Southeast Asia
in the 1950s.

Each phase is marked by some symbolic events

and characteristics which shifted the focus of Japanese
foreign aid: reparations payments in the first phase; the
oil crisis in the early 197 0s in the second phase; the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia in the third phase; and rapid rise in value of
yen in the fourth phase.

This chapter will illustrate each

phase in more detail and examine Japanese security interests
in each phase.
Phase One: 1956 - 1974
Having lost a source of raw materials and markets
during WWII, Japan sought to normalize relations with
resource-rich Southeast Asia and acquire access to the
natural resources and develop new markets there.

Both the

Kishi and Ikeda Administrations saw Asia as a potential
contributor to Japan's own postwar economic recovery and
growth.

The objectives of Japanese aid during the first

phase were to expand export markets for Japan's rapidly
36
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developing manufacturing sector and to stabilize the socio
economic and political systems of recipient countries which,
in the end, contributed to Japan's own national security.
The aim of promoting Japanese exports was officially
stated by the MFA.
Japan depends on the markets of less-developed countries
for close to 45 percent of her exports and imports. Her
trade with Southeast Asia and other newly developing
areas amounts to approximately 10 percent of her gross
national product.
It is natural, therefore, that Japan,
which must trade to live, has a vital interest in the
steady economic development of Southeast Asia and other
less-developed regions and the expansion thereby of
their external purchasing powers. For example, Japan's
new ten-year plan to double the country's national
income by the end of the plan period (1961-1970)
envisages a 10 percent annual increase over the base
year in the total volume of her exports with an average
of 13 percent annual increase in the exports of heavy
industrial products. Such rates of increase of her
exports can hardly be achieved without a steady rise in
the capacity of less-developed countries to import.58
The Japanese did not connect aid and political objectives in
this phase.

Japanese foreign assistance was purely economic

and flowed only to noncommunist East and Southeast Asia.
The second part of the objective, maintenance of stable
socio-economic and political system in developing countries,
derived from Japan's fear of the widening gap between rich
and poor in developing countries, which was becoming
apparent.

The Japanese government foresaw a future threat

to Japanese national security, which depended on the

58Japan, MFA, Some Features of Japan's Development Assistance
(Tokyo: 1961), 1, quoted in Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign
Aid: Policy and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 1718.
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stability of its export markets in the neighboring
countries.

Japan took various measures, including

reparation payments, to avoid such threat from developing
countries.59
Phase Two: 1974 - 1979
The second phase is described as globalization and
diplomatic use of Japanese foreign aid.

The two major

changes in aid objectives came as a result of anti-Japanese
riots during Prime Minister Tanaka’s tour to Southeast Asia
in 1974 and the oil shock in the winter of 1973/74.
Tanaka's trip called for closer attention to Asia with
improved aid terms and conditions.
tool of Japanese foreign policy.

Aid became an important
The oil crisis not only

broadened the range of Japan's aid distribution to the
Middle East, Africa, and countries along energy shipping
routes but also established a strong linkage between
Japanese foreign aid and resource availability in the
recipient countries.60
Prior to this phase, Japanese mineral and oil companies
engaged only in refining and sales while Western companies
were active in the whole operation: exploration,
590ther measures include: providing loans; expanding overseas
investments; cooperating in the Colombo Plan; and contributing to
the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the
United Nations Special Fund, Asian Productivity Organization, and
the World Bank.
60Dennis T. Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan as an 'Aid Great Power',"
Pacific Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 492-493.
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development, and production.

Japanese companies had been

mainly interested in supplying raw materials and energy
sources as cheaply as possible to Japan.

After the oil

crisis of 1973-74, the Japanese government began to
encourage private companies to start exploration and
development projects by using bilateral aid.

The producing

countries ensured Japanese access to resource projects and
supplies in exchange for economic aid in the form of yen
credits and technical assistance.

Japanese aid was also

extended to infrastructure construction to complement largescale investments and projects launched by Japanese private
companies under a policy of MITI.61
Phase Three: 1979 - 1985
The third phase, described as multi-dimensional or
multi-purpose, emerged in the late 197 0s in response to
continuous criticism of Japanese tied aid and mounting
"burden-sharing11 pressure from the Western countries,
especially from the United States.

Political and strategic

considerations were incorporated into the original framework
of Japanese aid policy which focused solely on economy.
This is the period when Japan began to have a severe trade
imbalance problem with the United States.

Japan considered

it important to help the United States in the area of

61Shoko Tanaka, Post-War Japanese Resource Policies And
Strategies: The Case of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell ChinaJapan Program, 1986), 114-116.
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foreign aid by easing its share, taking the pressure off
from the bilateral trade problem.
The so-called "strategic aid" began in 1978 in the
midst of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Camp
David accords between Egypt and Israel, and the SinoJapanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship.62

Under the

"strategic aid," the Ohira Administration (December 1978 June 1980) increased ODA to nations which were important to
Japan and Western allies politically and strategically.

For

example, Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jamaica saw
a great increase in flow of assistance from Japan.63
Vietnam was cut off from Japanese aid after invading
Cambodia, and China became a recipient of Japanese economic
assistance for the first time.64

Regarding strategic

interests, one member of the Liberal Democratic Party was
cited as saying that:
"Aid must be considered from the standpoint of national
interest and not just humanitarian aspects. There
should be more thoughts given to aid along strategic
lines. At this point in time, Japanese military efforts
are restricted, but aid is possible. To some extent,
aid can be seen as a substitute for defense efforts, but
Japan must view them [aid and military .policy]

62The "strategic aid" is defined as an assistance to "countries
bordering areas of conflict."
63See Table 18.
64Dennis T. Yasutomo, Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and
Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986),
42.
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equally.,|65
The importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship and its
influence on creating the scheme of the "strategic aid" must
not be forgotten.66

President Carter influenced the shift

of Japanese aid policy in the late 1970s.

For example,

between 1977 and 1979, the pace of increase in grants were
faster than increase in total ODA.

The total ODA increased

189 percent while grants increased 257 percent.67
During this phase, economic assistance matured as a
foreign policy tool to promote social and economic
resilience; and prevent internal disorder and disputes and
external intervention. This was very important since
Japanese economy depended on the targeted countries as
sources of raw materials and markets.

Also, as pressure for

"burden-sharing" increased in the 1980s, foreign aid began
to be used as a strong diplomatic tool against Western
nations.

The strategic aid symbolizes a new Japanese

approach to foreign policy based on economic relations,
Japanese globalization of diplomacy, and national security
consciousness.68

65quoted in ibid., 25.
660rr, "Collaboration or Conflict?" op. cit., 746-747.
67Calculated by author based on DAC reports.
^Yasutomo, op. cit., 119-120.
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Phase Four: 1985 - Present
The fourth phase began in 1985, and has continued to
the present.

It is characterized by integration of aid

policy into overall Japanese foreign policy.

Foreign aid

has become a solid diplomatic tool against not only the
developing countries but also other donors in this world of
interdependence.

The high value of the yen rapidly

increased the amount of Japanese aid in dollar terms.

As a

result, Japanese foreign aid has gained a strong presence
and power in the international community.
According to the ODA Annual Report 1988, 1987 was
"Japan's year" which saw a spectacular growth in amount of
ODA.

Japan's ODA rose 32.3% over the previous year in

dollar term, reaching $7,454 billion.

In 1989, Japan became

the world's largest donor with ODA allocation of $8,965
billion.

The number of countries for which Japan is the

largest donor increased from 19 in 1985 to 30 in 1989.
These facts indicate Japan's stronger presence in developing
countries.
The two medium-term targets which emerged in this phase
were more comprehensive compared with the two previous ones.
They aimed at increasing not only the total amount but also
efficiency and effectiveness of Japanese aid.69

They

stressed an increase in ODA/GNP ratio, technical assistance,
and aid staff; an expansion of debt relief measures for
69Japan, MFA, Outlook of Japan's Economic Cooperation. 15.

43
LLDCs; and qualitative improvement of yen-denominated loans.
Japanese government realizes that in order for Japan to
survive in the world, it has to maintain good relations.with
both developing and developed countries through the tool of
foreign aid.
As illustrated here, Japan has been concerned about its
national interests and national security in every phase of
aid policy.

The target of aid in the first and second

phases was aimed at developing countries for purely economic
interests.

However, the latter two phases saw a political

use of aid against other Western nations for national
interest and national security purposes.

Japanese ODA has

been a tool to protect national security by securing raw
materials in developing countries and by maintaining export
markets in other Western countries.

CHAPTER V
JAPANESE FOREIGN AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

To illustrate the evolution of Japan's ODA program
through the four phases described above, three brief case
studies will be presented here.

Southeast Asia has been the

main destination of Japanese foreign aid.

The three

countries of ASEAN examined in this chapter— Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand— have always been major recipients
of Japanese aid.

As a matter of fact, Japan was the top

donor to all three countries in 1989.

ASEAN, which

accounted for over 30% of total Japanese disbursement in
1990, provides much needed resources and markets to Japan.
The large amount of aid poured in ASEAN shows that Japan’s
security interests lie in the region.

It is in Japan's

interest to maintain good relations with Southeast Asian
countries for its national security.
Indonesia
The year 1958 marked three important accomplishments in
Japan-Indonesia relations: the establishment of diplomatic
relation? the settlement of war reparation negotiations
which began in 1951; and the conclusion of the Economic
Cooperation Agreement.

The reparation payment, which
44
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totaled $223.3 million, was provided through purchase of
Japanese goods and services.

The economic cooperation

agreement stated that Japan would provide $4 00 million over
a period of twenty years.
ODA to Natural Resource Development
The Japanese government had committed itself to support
investment projects to develop major natural resources in
Indonesia, namely petroleum, nickel, and lumber.

There are

two well known projects in Indonesia supported by both the
Japanese government and private Japanese companies: the
North Sumatra Oil Project and the Asahan Aluminum Project.
The Sumatra Project exemplifies a shift in Japanese aid
policy from merely buying already available resources to
securing the resource through participating in development
efforts.

The Asahan Project illustrates export of resource

processing to a producing country and infrastructure
construction accompanies with it.
The North Sumatra oil fields were owned by Royal Dutch
and Shell before the Indonesian government took them over in
1957 .70

In 1958 the Indonesian government agreed to

receive Japanese capital and technology to rehabilitate
north Sumatra's oil fields in exchange for the oil supply to
Japan.

The Japanese government provided yen credits to

70Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia:
Tokvo-Jakarta Relations. 1951-1966 (Honolulu: The University Press
of Hawaii, 1976), 117-118.
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purchase equipment, facilities and services from Japan in a
ten-year period.

This was going to be repaid with oil

export to Japan for ten years.

The North Sumatra Oil

Development Cooperation Company was established in 1960 with
37.5% of the necessary capital provided by OECF.

By the

time the operation ended in 1973, seven more similar
projects were under operation in the area.

All of them were

engaged in the same form of production-sharing.71
In 1972, the Japanese government agreed to offer
further assistance, 62 billion yen ($20 million) in credit,
to Indonesia for an oil exploration project.

Later a 56

billion yen ($18 million) credit was approved by the
Japanese government for liquid natural gas (LNG) development
projects.

The Japanese government provided the necessary

capital for petroleum projects in Indonesia through credits
and loans.72

It promoted the Japanese private investments

in the oil industry with support in capital and security.
Japan's policy to diversify oil supply sources after the oil
crisis in the early 1970s further encouraged Japanese
involvement in Indonesian oil and LNG industries.
Throughout the 19 60s and early 1970s, Japanese
companies' desire to smelt overseas, due to its energyintensive operation, coincided with the Indonesian
government's policy to promote domestic smelting.
71Tanaka, op. cit. , 84-90.
72Ibid.

The
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Japanese government then designed the Asahan Aluminum
project, the largest Japanese project overseas with 400
billion yen ($1.5 billion by 1973 exchange rate) in
Indonesia, which included construction of two hydroelectric
powerplants and an aluminum refinery.

It was a form of

joint venture in which the Japanese government provided onehalf of the total Japanese investments through OECF.

In

1978 and 1979, Japan extended yen credits through OECF as a
project assistance.73 As illustrated by the two projects,
Japanese aid in Indonesia developed around natural resource
industries and much of the fund had been spent directly to
promote the industry until the 1980s.
Loans for Debt Payments
The fall in oil prices in the early 1980s decreased the
Indonesia's foreign exchange revenue and brought severe
budget and balance-of-payment problems.

This also affected

the country's ability to implement Japanese foreign aid
projects.

Tokyo has increased program assistance in ODA

lending to reduce pressure on Indonesia for project
implementation.74 At a meeting with President Suharto in
January 1987, the MITI Minister Tamura pledged broader
assistance to boost Indonesia's export-oriented

^Ibid., 95-96.
740rr, "Rising Sun," op. cit., 52.
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industries.75 Meanwhile the second fall in oil prices in
1986, while the value of yen doubled, further hit the
Indonesian economy.

The country's public and private debt

amounted $4 5.7 billion, one third of it owed to the
Japanese, mostly to the government, in yen.

Indonesia

requested to pay back its official debt at 1986 exchange
rate.

However, instead of accepting Indonesia's request and.

approving payment at the 198 6 exchange rate, Japan responded
with almost doubling its ODA from $1.23 to $2.3 billion.76
Japan also provided $100 million in grants and lowered the
interest rates on the Indonesian loans from 3% to 2.7%.77
In 1989 Indonesia was still suffering from the drop in
oil revenue, and also from unemployment caused by recession.
Repayments on foreign debt were taking 40% of government
revenue.

Prime Minister Takeshita visited Indonesia with an

aid package of $2 billion in soft loans and $110 million in
grants and technical assistance.78

75"MITI Minister Tamura Pledges Increased Aid to Indonesia,"
Asahi Evening News. 13 January 1987.
76,'Japan Balks at Indonesian Debt Plan," Asahi Evening News.
8 June 1988.
77In order to enforce "self-help" efforts with repayment
obligation, Japan often provides grants to indebted countries after
they make the payment to help them balance their government budget.
The amount of grants are usually the same as the amount repaid by
the recipients. Mr. Shiro Sadoshima, First Secretary, Embassy of
Japan, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, D.C., 10
March 1992.
78 "Indonesia and Japan: Donors' kebab," Economist May 13 1989,
77.
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Attracting Direct Investments
The high value of the yen encouraged Japanese
manufacturers to move their facilities to Southeast Asia,
first to Singapore, then to Thailand and Malaysia, and
finally to Indonesia where the labor cost is 95% lower than
in Japan.79

It must also be mentioned that improvement in

infrastructure funded by Japanese loans met one of the
criteria for direct investments.

This trend began to show

some positive effects in Indonesian non-oil and gas exports.
The economic growth rate of non-oil and gas industries was
5.7% in 1988 and 7.4% in 1989.

Their value in exports

increased by $2 billion during the same period.80

The

mushrooming loans, pledged technical assistance, and
lowering interest rates, accompanied by private investments
in manufacture, may be helping Indonesia shift its focus
away from oil and LNG industries.
A Case of Japanese ODA Project
The case illustrated here is called “The Borobudul
Prambanan National Historic Park Construction Project" in
central Java.81

The Borobudul was a Buddhist temple which

79Ford S. Worthy, "Japan's Spreading Regional Power," Fortune
vol. 122, (Fall 1990), 96.
80Japan, MFA,
Activities. 148.

Diplomatic

Bluebook

1990:

Japan's

Diplomatic

81The
information
on
this
project
is
summarized
in
"Insensitivity or Menace?: The Borobudul National Historic Park,"
AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review vol. 21, no. 4, 33-36.
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was constructed in late 8th century or early 9th century and
buried underground until its discovery in the 19th century.
The Pranbanan (Loro Jonggrang) Temple is a beautiful example
of Hindu architecture, 4 0 km east of Borobudul.

The project

was aimed to attract more tourists into the area by
constructing a major historic area surrounding the ruins.
The project took off in 1980 with a 440 million
yen($1.9 million) loan from Japan followed by a 2.8 billion
yen($11 million) loan in 1982.

The project required 350

households on 85 hectares of the construction site to leave
their houses and land.

Many of the local residents were

engaged in sap-gathering and sugar-processing, and others
operated souvenir shops.

The residents had to leave the

project site either with compensation much lower than market
price or with other lands.

Having completed the project,

the number of tourists increased.

They go to an expensive

restaurant for tourists in the park which is a branch of
Ambarukmo Hotel in the suburbs of Jogjakarta.

The hotel was

built with Japanese reparation payments, is run by Japan Air
Lines, and has become a popular hotel among Japanese
tourists.

The people who used to live there are now

construction workers and vendors living in much worse houses
than before.
This is an example of commercialized aid.
business benefitted from the large construction.

Japanese
However,

the recipients' ordinary people's interests were totally
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ignored.
The Philippines
The Japanese reparation payments to the Philippines
began in 1956 and totaled $550 million over twenty years.
Much of infrastructure and public facilities had been
destroyed by bombing during the Pacific War.

As a result, a

large portion of the reparations was spent on public works,
transport and communications, education, and health
facilities between 1959 and 1969.82
During the reparation period, Japan's share in total
ODA to the Philippines was significantly lower than that of
the U.S.

However by the end of the 1970s, the positions

were reversed.

Loans through the OECF began in 1971 and

since then, the rapid increase in loans put Japan as the
number one donor to the Philippines.
commitment to the Philippines stood at
approximately $2.3 billion.83

By 1986, Japan's loan
515 billion yen, or

Since Corazon Aquino became

the president, the Japanese government has been pledging
loans to ease her country's debt crisis in order to
stabilize the economy.
Aid Under "Burden-Sharing"
The Philippines is one of the most controversial
82Filologo Pante, Jr. and Romeo A. Reyes, "Japanese and U.S.
Aid to the Philippines: A Recipient-Country Perspective," in Yen
for Development. 122.
83Pante and Reyes, op. cit., 12 5.
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recipients of Japanese ODA.
among the Japanese.

It brought up two criticisms

The first criticism was that Japan was

providing aid to the Philippines to support American
strategic objectives.84

Especially after the Vietnam War

and emergence of communist nations in Indochina, the
presence of American military bases in the Philippines
increased the importance of the country.

Even since the

reparations ended in 197 6, the Philippines have been a major
recipient of Japanese aid.

This coincided with the

emergence of "strategic aid" and "burden-sharing" in
Japanese aid policy.

This trend was confirmed when the

Japanese government joined with the U.S. to support the
mini-Marshall Plan for the Philippines in July 1989.85
The second criticism was that Japanese aid to the
Philippines (in the period 1972 to 1986) was merely filling
the coffers of the Marcos family.

This relates to the first

criticism on the point that Japan was serving U.S. interest.
The U.S. sought to maintain good relations with the
Philippines and also desired to see a stable government for
its bases.

Japan continued the aid flow even though it knew

of aid-related kickbacks to Marcos.86

This criticism

840rr, "Rising Sun," op. cit., 53.
85Yanagihara and Emig, op. cit., 62.
86President Marcos was believed to have received rebates of
Japanese foreign aid. The amount sometimes totaled as much as 15%
of an aid project.
In order to cover the corruption, Prime
Minister Nakasone suggested that Philippine Vice President
Salvatore Laurel regard the issue as a domestic matter.
Yuji
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increased after the assassination of Benigno Aquino in
August 19 83.87
Two Cases of Japanese ODA Project
Two cases of Japanese ODA in the Philippines show the
commercialism of Japanese aid and the strong influence of
Marcos family on aid projects.

The first project is called

"The Outpatient Department of the Philippine General
Hospital"88 which first appeared as a $6.70 million plan
submitted by the director of the department at the hospital.
The aim was to improve equipment and extend consultation
hours in order to accept 2,000 patients a day; to function
as a supplement of the Metro Manila medical facilities; and
to initiate research to extend progressive medical care
throughout the country.

In August 1985, the budget was

increased to $10 million, to be funded by grants-in-aid.
Because the Philippine government changed hands in February
of 1986, the project was forgotten for a year until the
Japanese government re-acknowledged it.

At this time the

budget was increased to $20 million.
After fifteen-months of construction work by a Japanese
construction firm, the inauguration ceremony took place on
Suzuki, "Rethinking Japanese Foreign Aid," Japan Times 30 June
1986, 8.
870rr, "Rising Sun," op. cit. , 53.
88The information on this case is summarized in "A Showcase of
Japanese High Technology: Outpatient Department of the Philippine
General Hospital," AMPO, op. cit., 24-25.
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April 5, 1989.

The three-story modern building has four

divisions: consultation, diagnosis, management, and the
common section equipped with a $600,000 CT Scan unit, a
$200,000 X-ray diagnostic apparatus, and other computerized
office facilities.

The completion of construction was not

the end of a project and problems still remained for the
Filipinos.

The high technology equipment is dependent on

Japan for repair parts, and consumption goods must be
imported from Japan.

The Japanese construction firm

benefitted from the project and so did the supplier of
equipment.

Grant aid, even though the government says

"untied", can be tied in this way.
The second case, "The Expansion of the National
Maritime Polytechnic Project,"89 hoped to increase the
number of eligible crew to work on foreign ships.In 1983,
12.4% of Filipino crews worked on foreign ships.

They were

obliged to send 80% of their earnings back home by the
Philippine government. This was an important source of
foreign exchange to the Philippines.

In order for a crewman

to work on foreign ships, he must receive training required
by international treaty and be certified.

There were two

national training facilities; the Philippine National
Merchant University in Manila and the newly founded National
89The information on this project is summarized in "Nakasone
sori no temiyagewa sanjyunanaokuen (Prime Minister Nakasone's
souvenir is 3.7 billion yen," Musekinin eniotaikoku Nippon
(Irresponsible Great ODA Donor. Japan)
(Tokyo, Japan: JICC
Publisher, 1989), 47-52.
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Maritime Polytechnic.

Both facilities had requested

assistance for the expansion to the Japanese government.
Japan considered the university as the prime project until
Imelda Marcos made a special request eighteen days before
Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Philippines.

The

Japanese government changed its mind and decided to aid the
polytechnic expansion.

After the meeting between President

Marcos and Prime Minister Nakasone on May 7, 1983, the
project progressed step by step and the first official
contract was signed in June 1984.
By March 1986 a first rate, even by international
standards, modern training facility was constructed with a
total of 37 million yen.90

The original plan was to train

7 60 students per year, but there were only 22 students
enrolled in the first semester and only one of them finished
the fifteen week course.

Even with some adjustment made in

courses to attract more students, the facility has not been
used even to 5% of its goal.

The school itself cannot

collect the necessary fees (tuition), so the money must come
from taxpayers' pockets because the maintenance cost is paid
by the recipient country.

The main reason for the under

utilization is said to be the location of the school.

It is

located in a small regional city of Tacloban in Leyte, 25
hours from Manila and with no major commercial port.

90$155,110 by 1985 exchange rate and $219,558 by 1986 exchange
rate.
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However, it is the province of the Romualdez family, whose
best known member is Imelda Marcos.
Thailand
Unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, Thailand has
maintained trade relations with Japan since the end of World
War II.
1983 .91

Japan was Thailand's biggest export market in
Since then Thailand has been a major recipient of

Japanese aid.

In 1988 Japan provided 70.2% ($360.62

million) of total bilateral ODA received by Thailand.92
However, the Thai people see a different picture.

For them

the United States is the largest donor and over two thirds
of them think the beneficiary of Japanese aid is "Japan
itself."93

The main reason for this negative image of

Japanese ODA is that 80% of the fund is in the form of yen
loans, which accumulated to over 690 billion yen ($5.4
billion by 1988 exchange rate) by 1988.

A large portion of

the loans are spent on infrastructure and large-scale
projects such as roads and dam construction, communication
Systems, and harbor expansion.
Trinity of Assistance, Investment, and Import
Japan regards Thailand as the industrial base of the
91T. H. Silcock, "Outline of Economic Development 1945-1965,"
in Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development ed. T. H.
Silcock (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967), 17.
92Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA '90. 78.
93"Building Roads for Japanese Investment," AMPO, op. cit., 38.
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ASEAN economy.

MITI Minister Tamura announced the "New

Asian Industries Development (New AID Plan) in January 1987
during his visit to Bangkok.

This model calls for the

trinity of assistance, direct investment, and import as a
cooperation package to promote synthetic development of each
recipient.

Cooperation with Thailand has already been

carried out.94

There are massive Japanese private

investment flows into Thailand.

The rapid increase in yen

value has created a strong trend to move production to
developing countries.

The 1989 Japanese investment in

Thailand was $1.2 billion which was more than the total of
previous 35 years combined.95
There are several reasons for the popularity of
Thailand as an investment target. Thailand offers; 1) a
cheap labor force with good quality; 2) political stability;
and 3) investment promotion measures.96

The Japanese

Ambassador, Okazaki, said "Thailand, like Japan, is
Buddhist.

And a monarchy.

And a civilized country with a

government that respects contracts and leaves business
alone.1,97
Further, Narongachai Akrasanne, director of the
94Japan, MITI Keizai Kvorvoku no Genio to Mondaiten.
(Reality, and Problems of Economic Cooperation). 166-168.

1987

95Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rises Over the Pacific" National
Geographic vol. 180 no. 5 (November 1991), 55.
96Japan, MITI Keizai Kvorvoku no Genio to Mondaiten 1987. 66.
97Zich, op. cit., 56.
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Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, stated:
We're easy to get along with. For 700 years we've been
an inland trade route, a land bridge between north and
south. We are mixed, like the Americans. Our identity
is cultural not ethnic: We're Thai, Indian, Malay,
Chinese-name it. There is no racial discrimination
here. The Thai people rarely have strong feelings about
anything.98
Japanese ODA is said to be making a foundation by improving
infrastructure for Japanese business opportunities.
Thailand is a major exporter of tin to Japan.

Since

tin is not considered a significant industry, massive
"develop and import" policies, like those seen in the
Indonesian petroleum industry, did not exist in Thailand.99
Instead, a rapid increase in aid flow to Thailand was the
result of "strategic aid."

The Vietnamese invasion of

Cambodia in 1978 caused a massive influx of Indochinese
refugees into Thailand.

The burden on what was already the

poorest region in Thailand could not be borne by the Thai
government alone.

The increase in aid since the invasion

was so rapid that Thailand became the second largest
recipient of Japanese ODA after China in 1983 .100

98Ibid.
"Tanaka, op. cit., 108.
100Chart in William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr. "Japan's
Foreign Economic Assistance," Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no. 3 (March
1985), 330.
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A Case of Japanese ODA Project
The Thai Cultural Center101 was one of the projects
undertaken to commemorate one hundred years of friendly
relationship between Japan and Thailand.

It was constructed

with 640 million yen ($4.4 billion by 1987 exchange rate)
grants-in-aid from Japan and opened in October 1987.

The

Center has a large auditorium with 2,000 seating capacity
and a smaller one with 500 seating capacity.

There is an

Education Hall with exhibition rooms, a series of audio
visual rooms, a library, conference rooms, etc.

Both the

center's exterior and the interior are magnificent.

The

sound and lighting system of the large auditorium is high
tech and its seats can be moved with a signal button.

There

is equipment for the simultaneous interpretation of up to
four languages.
Cultural activities and recreation are the main purpose
of the center and these are not free. In order to use the
large auditorium for three hours, for example, one must pay
36,000 baht, which few can afford, for air-conditioning and
sound and lighting system, etc.

Also, due to the high

rental charge, the admission cost is two to three times more
than the cost for seeing a movie at an ordinary movie
theater.
From the beginning, everything was done by the
101The information on this project is summarized in "Thailand
Cultural Center: Better to Call it Japanese?," AMPO, op. cit., 4042.
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Japanese; including the designing of the building, the
procurement of materials, and the construction.

The Thais

received only a low amount of wages for construction labor.
The under-utilized facilities cost the Thai government 20.79
million baht, 18.5 million baht, and 17.98 million baht,
respectively, for the three years between 1987-89.

In a

recent period, they were used eleven days out of two months.
The equipment and spare parts will have to be bought from
Japan in the future, which adds more cost to the Thai
government.

Again, profit for Japanese contractors and

burden for the recipient came out of so called "grant aid."
As illustrated above, Japanese national interests
have always influenced its aid policy in Southeast Asia.
Since the region was the first recipient of Japan's first
ODA— reparation— , it has the longest history of
accommodating Japan's national interests.

The region

provides raw materials which Japan needs for its domestic
industries, markets for Japan's exports, and direct
investment opportunities.

By tying aid, Japanese business

gained long-term access through the development assistance
projects.

These are exactly the points criticized by

others, but have worked to the Japanese advantage since the
beginning of ODA history.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Japan has developed through trade.

Since military

means to meet its goals were taken away after the World War
II, Japan’s survival as a nation, has had to depend on an
economic means, specifically its ability to import raw
materials and export finished products.

Japan's national

security interests— obtain secure access to natural
resources and markets for its exports— stem from its
inability to survive on its own.
aware of this fact.

The Japanese were well

This is why Japan used the

neomercantilist policy to pull itself out of a lost war and
achieve economic prosperity.

Japan did so by successfully

pursuing its security interests through the use of foreign
aid.
Japanese foreign aid first began as war reparations to
Southeast Asia through which Japan promoted exports of
finished products from its growing heavy industry.

The

reparations were provided as procurement of Japanese goods
and services.

Southeast Asia was also able to provide Japan

with its much needed natural resources.

The heavy

concentration in the region during this period well served
Japan's national interests.
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After the oil shock in 1973/74, Japan's focus on the
national security through neomercantilist strategy shifted
towards securing natural resources.

It insured access to

resources by expanding geographical distribution to the
Middle East and Africa and participating in resource
development projects with financial and technical support
through official aid.

Japan also began to allocate foreign

aid to countries which are located along its energy shipping
routes in order to maintain the flow of resources.

The

North Sumatra Project in Indonesia is a typical case of a
"develop and import" scheme which emerged during the second
phase.

Loans provided to finance big development projects

greatly profited the Japanese contractors and also a
established long-term relationship through tied aid.
In the late 197 0s, the world saw aggressive military
invasions by communist regimes.

This influenced Japanese

foreign aid policy towards being political and facilitated
the use of foreign aid as a diplomatic tool.

By providing

assistance to countries, where conflicts exist in
neighboring countries, under the scheme of "strategic aid,"
Japan protected its access to resources by developing
countries and protecting export markets there.
Japanese "strategic aid" to countries with Western
strategic interests was also used as a diplomatic tool to
ease the mounting pressure of "burden sharing."

Europe and

the United States were increasingly dissatisfied with trade
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imbalances with Japan.

Therefore, it was very important for

Japan to take some share of the burden in order to keep good
relations with its allies and leave Western markets open for
Japanese exports.

The aid to the Philippines is a good

example of aid by "burden-sharing."

Since the Philippines

was not a significant source of raw materials and export
markets for Japan, the U.S. role in influencing Japanese
decisions to maintain the large flow of aid to the country
cannot be ignored.
The last phase, which still continues today, has seen
important changes in the world as well as in Japanese aid
policy.

The rapid increase of yen value has led to

satisfaction with the quantity of Japanese aid and, as

a

result, has shifted the focus to quantitative improvement
emphasis.

The end of the Cold War has also led Japanto

shift aid from providing large aid to strategically
important countries to the important markets, Western,
democracies, and improving aid quality.

Furthermore, the

continuous criticism from other donors about concentration
of aid in Asia and commercialized aid, illustrated in
projects such as "The Borobudul Prambanan National Historic
Park," "The Philippine General Hospital," and "The Thai
Cultural Center," has played a role in improving the aid
quality and geographical allocation.

As a result of these

factors, the Third and Fourth Medium-Term Targets emphasize
improvement in quality and allocation to the LLDCs as the
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main pillars.

The pressure for "burden sharing" has further

increased in accordance with the high value of the yen and
the severe trade imbalances with the West, especially with
the United States.
In the post-war period, Japan has always had a fear of
not having enough resources for its industries and a lack of
markets to sell its exports to.

Whether it was reminded

repeatedly or not, it is clear that Japan always had this in
mind.

Japanese foreign aid has served as a means to pursue

the national security in order to eliminate this fear.

It

has become a common practice of Japanese foreign aid not
only to secure the flow of natural resources from developing
countries but also to assure open export markets in
developed countries by shouldering some of the Western
countries1 share of burden.

After almost four decades

Japanese foreign aid has firmly established a position in
Japanese overall foreign policy as a diplomatic tool to
pursue national security in this world of interdependence.
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Table i
Japan's Grant Assistance
(Million Dollars, %)
1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

1985

1987

1989

Amount

121

220

273

948

1,416

1,744

2,011

2,028

Share in
Total ODA

38.6

39.9

48.2

50.0

39.6

47.5

47.3

n.a.

Share in
Bilateral ODA

32.6

28.8

24.6

30.9

34.0

46.3

n.a.

44.8

Year

Source: DAC Reports, Outlook of Japan's Economic Cooperation, and Japan’s ODA 1988
and 1990.

Table 2
Distribution of General Grant Aid to LLDCs

l%)
Year

1981

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

LLDC

30.4

22.2

26.7

30.8

32.2

39.3

33.0

35.8

MSAC

32.8

50.8

32.9

31.8

26.7

23.7

25.9

23.5

Others

36.8

27.0

39.4

37.4

41.1

37.0

41.1

40.7

Source: Japan's ODA 1987 and 1990.
Note: Grant aid for d ebt relief is included.
MSAC: Most seriously affected countries by the oil crises.
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Table 3
Major Recipient Countries of Grant Assistance
(percentage of total ODA)
1983

1981
Rank-

Country

Share

Country

1985
Share

Country

Share

1

Thailand

9.60

Thailand

9.01

Bangladesh

8.48

2

Bangladesh

8.50

Bangladesh

7.45

Thailand

7.18

3

Pakistan

6.42

Burma

6.62

Burma

5.96

4

Burma

5.49

Pakistan

5.97

Pakistan

5.19

5

Indonesia

5.00

Philippines

5.48

Sri Lanka

5.15

6

Sri Lanka

4.94

Indonesia

5.28

Philippines

4.69

7

Nepal

4.87

Sri Lanka

5.14

Indonesia

4.66

8

Philippines

4.69

P.R. China

5.13

Sudan

3.69

9

Egypt

3.24

Nepal

3.81

Nepal

3.56

10

Sudan

2.82

Sudan

3.73

P.R. China

3.38

1988
Rank

Country

1989
Share

1990

Country

Share

Country

Share

1

Bangladesh

7.07

Bangladesh

7.90

Bangladesh

9.60

2

Philippines

6.61

Philippines

7.06

Philippines

6.63

3

Pakistan

5.42

Pakistan

4.76

Thailand

5.53

4

Thailand

4.65

Thailand

4.43

Sri Lanka

5.41

5

Sri Lanka

4.42

Sri Lanka

4.22

Indonesia

4.25

6

P.R. China

3.97

Indonesia

4.06

Pakistan

4.08

7

Indonesia

3.56

Zambia

3.71

Senegal

3.65

8.

Zaire

3.00

Kenya

3.13

Kenya

3.61

9

Sudan

2.98

Tanzania

3.02

Egypt

3.30

10

Nepal

2.76

Sudan

2.87

P.R. China

2.75

Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987, 1988, 1990, and Outlook of Japan’s
Economic Cooperation
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Table 4
Geographical Distribution of Bilateral Grant Assistance
(Million Dollars)
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

481.79

654.37

683.92

762.40

639.16

N ortheast Asia

25.68

54.53

52.35

58.53

38.61

Southeast Asia

241.88

278.01

260.69

330.98

273.00

Southwest Asia

214.22

321.83

370.88

372.89

327.55

82.55

107.90

127.10

97.53

113.24

211.90

272.98

525.96

518.59

423.23

Latin America

45.06

79.24

96.30

119.20

117.17

Oecania

45.06

36.09

46.06

54.20

61.40

-

0.34

-

Asia

Middle East
Africa

Europe
Unallocable
Total

1.08

-

1.05

3.13

3.85

3.05

19.85

854.55

1,154.06

1,483.19

1,556.06

1,374.05

Source: Jap an ’s ODA Annual Report 1987, 1988, 1989, and Outlook of Jap an ’s
Eocnomic Cooperation
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Table 5
Bilateral Technical Cooperation
(Million Dollars)
Year

1965

1969

1973

1976

1981

1985

1989

1990

Amount

6.01

18.96

57.24

108.1

338

422

1,556

1,374

Source: DAC Reports

Table 6
Geographical Distribution of Bilateral Techincal Assistance
(Million Dollars)
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

367.73

451.10

601.74

613.29

707.39

N ortheast Asia

97.28

129.28

177.40

189.63

275.51

Southeast Asia

222.28

257.52

342.58

343.63

351.24

Southwest Asia

44.53

61.69

78.13

76.75

76.30

3.54

2.61

3.64

3.28

4.32

Middle East

43.40

52.03

72.55

83.22

96.06

Africa

69.35

89.74

110.41

113.46

124.89

129.19

152.77

185.62

181.27

199.10

Oceania

16.39

20.05

28.98

30.07

32.00

Europe

2.90

2.67

4.28

5.03

11.85

Unallocable

219.80

298.69

420.90

454.86

474.06

Total

848.66

1,067.04

1,424.49

1,481.20

1,645.35

Asia

Unspecified

Latin America

Source: Jap an ’s ODA Annual Report 1987, 1988, 1989, and Outlook of Japan’s
Economic Cooperation
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Table 7
Sectoral Distribution of ODA Loans
(Million Dollars, percentage of total ODA)
1987
Amount
Social Infrastructure
and Services
Economic Infrastructure
and Services

Production Sectors

1988
Share

Debt Reorganization

Amount

Share

5.3

801

9.1

355

7.2

3,324

64.7

4,480

51.1

2,131

42.5

422

8.3

1,215

13.8

563

11.5

49

0.5

52

1.1

1,048

20.4

1,981

22.6

1,620

32.1

67

1.3

247

2.8

156

3.1

14

0.1

14

2.5

Unallocated

Total

Share

276

Multisector

Progam Assistance

Amount

1989

5,137

100.0

8,786

Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1988, 1989, and 1990

100.0

4,890

100.0
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Table 8
Geographical Distribution of Japan’s ODA Loans
(100 million yen, %)
19.84

1982

1986

Amount

Share

Amount

Share

Amount

Share

3,643

65.5

5,084

88.5

2,868

74.8

ASEAN &
Burma

1,948

35.0

2,930

51.1

2,630

35.8

Middle East

783

14.1

266

4.6

589

12.3

Africa

483

8.7

84

1.5

399

1.3

Latin
America

655

11.8

307

5.3

305

10.9

0

0

8

0.1

103

0.8

5,563

100

7,323

100

7,323

100

Asia

Oceania &
Others
Total

1987
Amount

1988
Share

Amount

1989
Share

Amount

Share

6,280

67.3

9,255

83.0

7,087

70.1

3,233

21.7

4,821

43.1

4,358

43.1

Middle
East

389

13.8

545

4.9

794

7.9

Africa

290

9.3

972

8.7

805

8.0

Latin
America

72

7.2

264

2.4

1,206

2.1

Oceania &
Others

6

2.4

120

1.1

214

2.1

7,037

100

Asia
ASEAN &
Burma

Total

11,156

Source: Jap an ’s ODA Annual Report 1987 and 1990

100

10,105

100
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Table 9
Share of Multilateral Assistance of Major DAC Countries
(percentage of total ODA)
Japan

U.S.

France

West
Germany

U.K.

DAC
Average

197.6

31.9

34.5

14.0

24.6

30.4

30.4

1978

30.9

38.7

13.1

35.5

42.1

34.0

1980

40.7

38.8

16.8

34.9

28.4

33.6

1982

21.7

40.7

17.9

28.1

46.8

33.6 .

1983

35.5

31.2

17.6

33.9

46.7

32.5

1984

43^8

25.9

16.3

32.9

45.2

31.5

1985

32.7

13.0

18.4

32.7

43.8

25.5

1986

31.7

20.5

18.5

31.0

41.8

28.5

1987

29.6

21.7

18.4

29.6

46:1

27.5

1988

29.7

33.3

18.4

33.0

45.9

31.1

1989

24.4

11.1

17.7

35.8

43.4

26.7

Source: DAC Reports
Note: Figures include contributions to EEC.

Table 10
Share of Multilateral Assistance in Japan’s Total ODA
(percentage of total ODA)
Year

1970

1976

1980

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Share

18.9

31.9

40.7

43.8

32.7

31.7

29.6

29.7

24.4

Source: DAC Reports
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Table 11
Share of Tied Bilateral Aid of DAC Countries
(percentage of total ODA)
1986

1987

1988

1989

Australia

38.7

44.0

43.7

89.6

Austria

68.8

74.3

98.1

83.6

Belgium

52.9

49.4

n.a.

n.a.

Canada

35.1

35.1

n.a.

52.2

Denmark

28.9

30.0

26.3

n.a.

Finland

38.2

55.8

73.5

79.2

France

46.6

40.9

45.4

48.5

West Germany

36.3

42.9

45.2

n.a.

Ireland

n.a.

33.8

n.a.

n.a.

Italy

65.4

71.7

87.7

90.9

Japan

13.4

11.3

12.8

18.0

Netherlands

15.8

14.0

14.1

13.7

New Zealand

34.5

34.2

40.2

n.a.

Norway

15.2

24.2

42.4

28.7

Sweden

15.3

24.6

31.1

(29.1)

Switzerland

23.9

35.9

20.5

n.a.

United Kingdom

64.5

61.8

82.6

76.0

U.S.A.

38.9

18.0

54.2

45.4

Source: DAC Reports
Note: ( ) is provisional figure.
: Figures for 1987 are tying status of all ODA.
: Figures for 1989 are commitment basis.
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Table 12
Share of Geographical Distribution of Bilateral ODA
(percentage of total ODA)
1975

1980

1982

1985

1988

1990

75.0

70.5

68.6

67.7

62.8

59.3

N ortheast Asia

8.9

4.2

15.8

15.3

11.3

12.0

Southeast Asia

50.1

44.0

33.5

37.6

34.2

34.3

(44.7)

(35.9)

(28.9)

(31.3)

(29.9)

(33.1)

15.6

22.2

19.0

14.7

17.3

12.9

Unspecified

3.9

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.0

Middle East

10.6

10.4

8.2

7.9

9.1

10.2

Africa

6.9

11.4

11.3

9.9

13.8

11.4

Latin America

5.6

6.0

7.8

8.8

6.2

8.1

Oceania

0.6

0.6

1.0

0.9

1.4

1.6

Europe

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

2.3

Unallocable

1.3

1.2

3.3

4.8

6.6

7,1

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Asia

(ASEAN)
Southwest Asia

Total

-

Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1989 and Outlook of Japan’s Economic
Cooperation

75
Table 13
The Major Recipients of Japanese Bilateral ODA
(percentage of total ODA)

Rank

Country

1980

1975

1970
Share

Country

Share

Country

Share

1

Indonesia

33.87

Indonesia

23.27

Indonesia

17.43

2

Korea

23.35

Korea

10.28

Bangladesh

10.70

3

Pakisatan

10.65

Philippines

8.27

Thailand

9.43

4

India

8.81

Malaysia

7.44

Burma

7.59

5

Philippines

5.18

Egypt

5.90

Egypt

6.12

6

Thailand

4.55

Bangladesh

5.53

Pakistan

5.59

7

Iran

3.22

India

5.48

Philippines

4.70

8

Burma

3.21

Thailand

4.85

Korea

3.80

9

China

2.57

Iraq

3.50

Malaysia

3.27

10

Singapore

1.55

Nigeria

3.21

Sri Lanka

2.23

1988

1985
Rank

Country

Share

Country

1990
Share

Country

Share

1

China

15.17

Indonesia

15.34

Indonesia

12.50

2

Thailand

10.33

China

10.49

China

10.42

3

Philippines

9.39

Philippines

8.33

Philippines

9.33

4

Indonesia

6.31

Thailand

5.62

Thailand

6.03

5

Burma

6.02

Bangladesh

5.32

Bangladesh

5.38

6

Malaysia

4.91

Pakistan

4.71

Malaysia

5.37

7

Bangladesh

4.75

Mynmar

4.04

Turkey

4.67

8

Pakistan

3.65

Sri Lanka

3.11

Pakistan

2.79

9

Sri Lanka

3.27

India

2.79

Sri Lanka

2.54

10

Egypt

2.86

Egypt

2.69

Poland

2.16

Source: DAC Reports and Outlook of Japan’s Economic Cooperation
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Table 14
Reparations and Reparation-related Grants
To Southeast Asian Nations
(Million Dollars)
Reparations
Country

Period

Burma

1955-65

Economic Development
Grants
Period

Amount

2.0

1965-77

140.0

-

-

1959-62

4.0

1958-70

223.3

-

Laos

-

-

1959-61

2.8

Malaysia

-

-

1968-70

8.2

1956-75

550.0

-

Singapore

-

-

1968-70

8.2

Thailand

-

-

1962-69

26.7

Cambodian
Indonesia

Philippines

South Vietnam
Total
Grand Total

1960-64

Amount

39.0
1012.3

-

-

-

-

189.9
1202.2

Source: Chaiwat Khamchoo, Japan’s Southeast Asian Policy in the Post-Vietnam
Era (1975-1985) (Ph. D. diss., University of Washington 1986), 61.
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Table 15
Japan’s G rant Share of total ODA and Grant Element
(%)
Year

1970

1972

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1985

G rant Share

38.6

32.6

48.2

48.1

40.0

39.6

46.1

47.5

G rant Element

67.2

61.1

74.9

75.0

74.3

74.0

73.7

73.6

Source: Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1987 and 1988.

Table 16
G rant Share
(percentage of total ODA)
Country

Rank

1986

Rank

1987/88

Rank

1988/89

Australia

1

100.0

1

100.0

1

100.0

New Zealand

1

100.0

1

100.0

1

100.0

Ireland

1

100.0

1

100.0

1

100.0

United Kingdom

1

100.0

8

97.8

8

98.1

Norway

5

99.2

6

99.4

6

99.7

Sweden

6

98.7

1

100.0

1

100.0

Canada

7

98.6

9

97.4

9

97.8

Switzerland

8

96.4

5

99.5

1

100.0

Finland

9

94.7

10

91.9

10

94.4

Netherlands

10

93.7

13

86.4

12

87.6

U.S.A.

11

91.1

11

91.2

11

92.6

Italy

12

90.2

15

76.9

14

76.9

Belgium

13

87.1

12 .

90.6

13

(87.0)

France

14

(78.1)

14

78.2

15

(73.1)

Denmark

15

77.1

7

88.1

7

98.7

West Germany

16

75.6

16

69.0

16

(68.5)

Austria

17

65.1

17

64.6

17

(48.8)

Japan

18

60.7

18

46.6

18

43.2

Source: DAC Report
Note: Excluding Debt Relief
: ( ) are provisional figures.
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Table 17
Grant Element
(percentage of total ODA)
Country

Rank

1986

Rank

1987/88

Rank

1988/89

Australia

1

100.0

1

100.0

1

100.0

New Zealand

1

100.0

1

100.0

1

100.0

Ireland

1

100.0

1

100.0

1

100.0

U.K.

1

100.0

9

99.0

9

99.1

Canada

5

99.9

6

99.6

6

99.7

Sweden

6

99.8

1

100.0

1

(100.0)

Norway

7

99.4

6

99.6

6

(99.7)

Switzerland

8

99.2

5

99.9

1

(100.0)

Finland

9

98.4

10

97.7

10

98.2

Belgium

10

97.8

13

94.0

12

(96.7)

Netherlands

11

97.6

12

94.1

13

94.2

Denmark

12

97.4

8

99.5

6

99.7

U.S.A.

13

96.8

11

96.9

11

97.5

Italy

14

96.0

14.

92.0

14

(92.8)

West Germany

15

89.1

16

86.1

16

(86.4)

France

16

86.1

1

89.3

15

(89!7)

Japan

17

81.7

18

75.4

17

77.6

Austria

18

79.6

17

76.2

18

(68.1)

Source: DAC Reports
Note: Excluding Debt Relief
: ( ) are provisional figures.
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Table 18
Total Japanese ODA
(Million Dollars)
1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Egypt

67.3

118.8

132.7

123.5

72.7

72.4

60.0

Jamaica

0.3

0.1

1.0

2.4

6.5

3.4

6.2

Pakistan

50.6

73.4

184.3

132.8

126.6

107.6

92.6

Thailand

59.4

127.2

188.8

275.8

236.6

194.8

354.2

Turkey

7.1

10.8

23.8

33.4

137.0

67.7

93.8

Source: OECD Reports
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